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Abstract 
 
Measurement of inequity in health care delivery has focused on the extent to which health care 
utilization is or is not distributed according to need, irrespective of income. Studies using cross-
sectional data have proposed various ways of measuring and standardizing for need, but inevitably 
much of the inter-individual variation in needs remains unobserved in cross-sections. This paper 
exploits panel data methods to improve the measurement by including the time-invariant part of 
unobserved heterogeneity into the need-standardization procedure. Using latent class hurdle 
models for GP and specialist visits estimated on 8 annual waves of the European Community 
Household Panel we compute indices of horizontal equity that partition total income-related 
variation in use into a need- and a non-need related part, not only for the observed but also for 
the unobserved but time-invariant component. We also propose and compare a more 
conservative index of horizontal inequity to the conventional statistic.  We find that many of the 
cross-country comparative results appear fairly robust to the panel data test, although the panel 
based methods lead to higher estimates of horizontal inequity for most countries. This confirms 
that better estimation and control for need often reveals more pro-rich distributions of utilization.  
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1. Introduction 
An equitable system of health care delivery appears to remain a core objective in most of 
the OECD member states with comprehensive and universal coverage and proposed 
health system reforms usually quote equity preservation or improvement as an important 
goal (OECD, 2004). Because in many countries horizontal equity is being interpreted as 
the principle of equal treatment for equal need, health economists have typically 
approached the measurement of inequity using inequality measures (Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer, 2000a). In most empirical work, horizontal inequity is measured as the degree 
to which utilization is still related to income after differences in needs across the income 
distribution have been appropriately standardized for (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 
2000b). Several cross-country comparisons have adopted variants of these methods to 
compare across countries in the European Union (Van Doorslaer , Koolman and Jones, 
2004), in the  OECD (Van Doorslaer, Masseria et al, 2004) and in Asia (Lu et al, 2007).  
Invariably, these comparative studies have relied on cross-sectional surveys and have 
adjusted for needs by comparing actual utilization distributions (by income) with need-
predicted utilization using some regression-based standardization procedure. This means 
that adjustment can only be made for need differences that are observed in general, self-
reported, health questions which are common across a large number of surveys. Typically, 
only a small fraction of the inter-individual variation in utilization measures like doctor 
visits can be explained by these models. And while an individual’s demographic and self-
reported health characteristics are known to be very strong – often by far the most 
powerful - predictors of health care utilization, it does nonetheless mean that most inter-
individual variation remains unexplained.  
This paper aims to go beyond the earlier approaches in at least three ways. First, the 
availability of the full eight waves of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP-
UDB), corresponding to the period 1994 to 2001, and the development of appropriate 
models for analyzing panel utilization data (Bago d’Uva (2006); Bago d’Uva and Jones 
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(2006)) provides an opportunity to further examine the unexplained variation in use.  The 
latent class model we use makes it possible to explicitly model the time-invariant 
components of individual unobserved heterogeneity and was the preferred specification 
to model our data on GP and specialist visits in Bago d’Uva and Jones (2006). 
Furthermore, by explaining the latent class membership probabilities dependent on the 
same set of covariates as the dependent variable, it becomes possible to partition their 
contribution to explained variation by need and non-need factors. In that way, some of 
the explicitly modelled individual heterogeneity can be included in the computation of the 
inequity index in the much same way as the observed heterogeneity. 
Secondly, by using a multi-year period to assess the degree to which there are any 
deviations between actual and needed utilization distributions, we move from a short to a 
long-run perspective. Jones and Lopéz-Nicolás (2004) have used short-run and long-run 
measures of income-related health inequality, to examine the important dynamic 
phenomenon of health–related income mobility. Adapting this method to our analyses of 
inequity in health care use, we are able to assess the discrepancies in the short-run and the 
long-run perspectives resulting from this phenomenon. In other words: it allows us to test 
whether those who were upwardly mobile in the income distribution are more or less 
likely to use health care. 
Finally, we propose a new measure of horizontal inequity in health care use that differs 
from the standard measure in the way that the variation left unexplained by the regression 
models is regarded. The conventional index of horizontal inequity is defined as a residual 
and labels as inequity all income-related inequality in use that is not demonstrably related 
to needs. That means that all the residual income-related variation, that is not explained 
by either the need or the non-need variables, is assumed to be inequitable. One problem 
with this approach is that some of this residual variation may in fact be due to need 
differences which are unobservable. An alternative estimate is to treat only the income-
related inequality that is demonstrably related to non-need variables as our index of 
inequity. The difference between the two indices depends on the degree to which the 
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income-related variation that is not due to included need and non-need variables is pro-
rich or pro-poor. By comparing both approaches we examine whether, in practice, they 
lead to different results, and whether one leads to systematically higher or lower inequity 
estimates than the other 
In what follows, we first explain how we will proceed with measuring inequity using panel 
data, then we describe the data we have used and the results obtained for the European 
countries we could include. In the final section we discuss what we can and cannot 
conclude from this study.   
 
2.  Methods for measurement of inequality 
2.1 Cross-sectional and longitudinal measures of inequality 
We measure income-related inequality in the utilisation of health care (GP and specialist 
visits) using the concentration index (Wagstaff et al, 1991; Kakwani et al, 1997). We 
compute the concentration index of the number of visits in wave t, tCI , using the 
convenient covariance formula (for example, Kakwani, 1980): 
( )tiit
t
t Ryy
CI ,cov2=      (1) 
where yit is the number of visits to a doctor for individual i in period t, ty  is the average of 
yit across individuals in period t, and 
t
iR  is the relative rank of individual i in the 
distribution of equivalised household income in period t. The concentration index takes 
on a positive/negative/zero value when there is pro-rich/pro-poor/no inequality. 
The analysis of income-related inequality in health care utilisation is extended to the 
analysis of long-run inequality with panel data, following the methodology proposed by 
for the analysis of income-related inequality in health. Jones and Lopéz-Nicolás (2004) 
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show that the long-run perspective uncovers important features of health inequality not 
identifiable in a cross-section or in repeated cross-sections. By analogy, we define the 
long-run concentration index of health care utilisation, TCI , as the concentration index 
for the average number of visits across periods, using as ranking variable the average 
income across periods. Jones and Lopéz-Nicolás (2004) show that, only when the income 
ranking remains constant over time, the long-run concentration index equals the 
(weighted) average of the short-run concentration indices, defined as: 
    ,  e      wher,
T
t
t
t
tt yT
ywCIw =∑                     (2) 
and Ty  equal to the average of ty across t. This measure, that can be obtained using 
repeated cross-sections, differs from TCI  to the extent that income ranks change over 
time and those changes are associated with systematic differences in health care 
utilisation. In particular, if individuals that are upwardly income mobile tend to use more 
health care, the level of long-run inequality given by TCI  will be larger than the weighted 
average of the short-run indices. 
2.2 Measurement of horizontal inequity: beyond the conventional approach   
Income-related inequality in health care does not imply inequity in health care. In 
particular, variation in the use of health care attributable to differences in morbidity may 
be seen as unavoidable and hence legitimate sources of inequality (see e.g., Van Doorslaer, 
Koolman and Jones, 2004). The horizontal version of the egalitarian principle requires 
that people in equal need of care are treated equally, regardless of socioeconomic factors 
such as income, level of education, place of residence, race, etc. 1 The concentration index 
of medical care use (CI) measures the degree of inequality in the use of medical care by 
                                                 
1 In this study, we focus solely on the issue of horizontal inequity, similar to most of the previous analyses 
of inequity in health care use. An exception is Sutton (2002) who studied both issues of vertical and 
horizontal inequity. 
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income, but does not control for need. Any measure of inequity in health care use has to 
account for the unequal distribution of need for such care.  
In the recent literature on inequity in health care use, it has become the norm to measure 
horizontal inequity (HI) as the difference between the concentration index of actual use 
and that of predicted need-expected utilisation, obtained from an econometric model for 
health care use (e.g. Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000; Van Doorslaer et al, 2000; Van 
Doorslaer, Koolman and Jones, 2004, hereafter DKJ). In this paper, we refer to this as 
the “conventional” HI index. This index measures the extent to which the difference 
between actual utilisation of health care and the use that would be expected on the basis 
of need is systematically related to the income rank of individuals. In the first applications 
of this methodology, need for medical care for each individual was measured as the 
predicted use from a regression on need indicators (e.g., Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 
2000; Van Doorslaer et al, 2000). Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2000) and Gravelle 
(2003) have however argued against the exclusion of non-need factors from the regression 
as this may lead to omitted variable bias in the estimation of the contributions of the need 
factors.2 More fully specified models can then be used for predicting need-expected health 
care utilisation, neutralising the impact of non-need variables by setting those equal to 
their means (e.g., DKJ, 2004). 
One important problem with the measurement of HI is that the dependent variable in 
health care demand models is typically specified as a nonlinear function of the regressors. 
For example, in DKJ (2004) the empirical models of health care use are based on logistic 
and truncated and generalized negative binomial regression models, which are intrinsically 
nonlinear. As long as the model is linear, predicting need-expected use by setting the non-
need variables equal to their mean (or, in fact, any constant value), achieves complete 
                                                 
2 The concern in Schokkaert and van de Voorde (2000) is not with need-standardisation in inequity 
measurement but rather with the issue of legitimate compensation in risk-adjustment. The two problems are 
however analogous in that the need/non-need dichotomy in the former is similar to the one between 
“compensation” and “responsibility” variables in the latter.  
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neutralisation of these variables. This does not hold for a nonlinear model and so the 
estimated HI is contingent on the values chosen for the non-need variables.  
The “conventional” HI index 
The first step in the computation of the “conventional” HI index is the prediction of 
need-expected utilisation based on the actual values of the xN variables. These predictions 
are contingent on the level of the non-need variables (xNN) that is selected. By analogy 
with the linear case, we use sample means of the non-need variables. For a nonlinear 
functional form G(.), the need-expected level of care is predicted as: 
[ ] ( )NNtNN NNNitN NNNtNitNit xxGxxyEy ∑∑ +== ββ ˆˆ,|ˆ        (3) 
The “conventional” HI index is then obtained by subtracting the concentration index of 
N
ityˆ , from the concentration index of yit: 
)ˆ( Nitt
conv
t yCICIHI −= ,                                                  (4) 
 We calculate short-run HI indices for each wave t, HItconv, and long-run measures using 
the average predicted number of visits across periods ( Niyˆ ), )ˆ(
N
iT
conv
T yCICIHI −= . 
Additionally, we compute “average” short-run HI indices, as the difference between the 
weighted average of the short-run indices, as in equation (2), and what is obtained when 
that formula is applied to the concentration indices of predicted utilisation. Note that the   
estimated vector of coefficients β) , which embodies the implicit vertical equity norm of 
the country’s system, and so determines what an individual needs, is country-specific but 
not wave-specific. We therefore assume that the norm of what constitutes needed and 
non-needed care use is constant across the period considered. 
The predictions of need-expected number of doctor visits, Nityˆ , result from a regression 
model, and so are intrinsically contaminated by prediction error. DKJ (2004) argue that 
the contribution of the residuals has to be attributed to either justifiable or unjustifiable 
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sources of inequity. In the “conventional” approach to HI measurement, followed in that 
paper, all that variation is classified as unjustifiable. In other words, any residual variation 
in health care use that is left unexplained, and that is systematically related to income rank, 
is assumed to be determined by non-need factors. This approach entails therefore a 
somewhat narrow definition of need, since it considers as legitimate health care use only 
what is shown (by the regression) to be systematically associated with need factors. 
However, DKJ (2004) note that their assumption is not indisputable, as some or all of the 
unexplained variation may capture unmeasured need.3 If one is willing to assume that all 
that variation reflects (unmeasured) need, then a natural alternative to the “conventional” 
HI index is one that equals the concentration index of non-need-expected health care use. 
This is a more “conservative” approach in that only the inequality that results from the 
observed systematic association between income rank and non-need factors is considered 
inequitable, whilst the residual variation is considered justifiable. So, the definition of need 
in this alternative method is broader than in the “conventional” method. The treatment of 
unexplained variation is highly relevant since count data like reported doctor visits are 
notably difficult to predict, especially in the tails of the distribution. 
The “conservative” HI index 
The computation of the “conservative” HI index requires the prediction of non-need-
expected utilisation, based on the actual values of the xNN variables, and on the sample 
means of the need variables xN: 
[ ] ( )NNitNN NNNtN NNNitNtNNit xxGxxyEy ∑∑ +== ββ ˆˆ,|ˆ        (5) 
                                                 
3 DKJ (2004) also decompose the “conventional” HI index in the contributions of different types of 
factors, including the residual contribution. The decomposition analysis makes the consequences of the 
assumptions transparent, as it makes it possible to assess whether the residuals make a pro-rich or a pro-
poor contribution to HI. It should however be noted that in a nonlinear setting the decomposition requires 
a linear approximation which means that the residual contribution arises both from a prediction error and 
from a linear approximation error. 
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The “conservative” HI index equals the concentration index of NNityˆ : 
HItcons= )ˆ(
NN
ityCI                                                  (6) 
Again, we can define short-run HI indices for each wave, HItcons, and long-run HI indices, 
HITcons = )ˆ( NNTyCI , where NNTyˆ  is the average of NNityˆ  across periods. We also compute 
“average” short-run HI indices, using equation (2) for NNityˆ  instead of actual utilisation. 
Similar to the “conventional” HI index, this index is contingent on the values used for the 
need variables in the computation of NNityˆ , which means that their effect is not completely 
neutralised.  
2.3 Need adjustment with the latent class hurdle model 
 We now turn to the methods for predicting Nityˆ  and NNityˆ , necessary in the computation of 
the HI indices described above. The availability of panel data makes it possible to control 
for unobserved individual heterogeneity when modelling the number of doctor visits. We 
use latent class hurdle models, as developed by Bago d’Uva (2006) and estimated with the 
ECHP data in Bago d’Uva and Jones (2006). A latent class (or finite mixture) framework 
is adopted in which individual effects are approximated using a discrete distribution. This 
framework offers an alternative representation of heterogeneity, where individuals are 
drawn from a finite number of latent classes. The latent class framework has been used 
previously in models for health care utilisation with cross-sectional individual data (e.g., 
Deb and Trivedi, 2002).  
Let yit represent the number of visits in year t. Denote the observations of the dependent 
variable over the panel as yi =[ yi1 ,…, yiTi] . Consider that individual i belongs to a latent 
class j, j=1,…,C, and that individuals are heterogeneous across classes. Conditional on the 
covariates considered, there is homogeneity within a given class j. Given the class that 
individual i belongs to, the dependent variable in a given year t, yit, has density fj(yit| xit,θ j ). 
The joint density of the dependent variable over the observed periods is a product of Ti 
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independent densities fj(yit| xit,θ j ), given class j. The probability of belonging to class j is 
πij, where 0<πij <1 and ΣCj=1πij =1. Unconditional on the latent class the individual 
belongs to, the joint density of yi =[ yi1 ,…, yiTi] is given by: 
( ) ( )jititT
t
j
C
j
ijCiCiii xyfxyg
i
θπθθππ ;|,...,;,...,;|
11
11 ∏∑
==
=                               (6) 
where xi is a vector of covariates, including a constant and θ j are vectors of parameters. 
Conditional on the class that the individual belongs to, the number of visits in period t, yit, 
is assumed to be determined by a hurdle model. The underlying distribution for the two 
stages of the hurdle model is the NegBin2.  The latent class panel data model accounts for 
the panel feature of the data in a flexible way that imposes no distribution on the 
unobserved individual effects. 
The discrete distribution of the heterogeneity has C mass points. In previous empirical 
applications of latent class model to health care utilisation, class membership probabilities 
were taken as parameters πij=πj, j=1,… ,C, to be estimated along with θ1, …, θC  (see e.g., 
Deb and Trivedi, 1997 and 2002; Deb and Holmes, 2000; Deb, 2001; Jimenez et al; 2002, 
Atella et al, 2004). These can also be parameterised as functions of time invariant 
individual characteristics zi. In this case, class membership is modelled as a multinomial 
logit (Clark et al, 2005; Clark and Etilé, 2006; Bago d’Uva and Jones, 2006): 
( )
( ) ,,...,1     ,'exp
'exp
1
Cj
z
z
C
g gi
ji
ij == ∑
=
γ
γ
π      (7) 
with γC=0. This uncovers the determinants of class membership.4 In a panel data context, 
this parameterisation provides a way to account for the possibility that the observed 
regressors may be correlated with the individual effect. In particular, we define zi. as the 
average over the observed panel of the observations on the covariates, ii xz = .  
                                                 
4 In previous latent class models for health care utilisation, this has been done through posterior analysis. 
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If one is interested in predicting the latent class that an individual belongs to, after the 
estimation of the model, it is possible to calculate the posterior probabilities of belonging 
to each given class. The posterior probability of membership in class j is given by: 
[ ] ( )( )∑ ∏
∏
= =
=
=∈ C
j
T
t jititjij
T
t jititjij
i
i
xyf
xyf
jiP
1 1
1
;|
;|
θπ
θπ
     (8) 
The individuals can then be assigned to the class with the highest posterior probability. 
In order to calculate the “conventional” and “conservative” HI indices, we require 
predictions of need-expected and non-need expected number of visits. The computation 
of predictions from the highly non-linear latent class hurdle models is not straightforward. 
While, in the estimation stage, these models control for unobserved heterogeneity, which 
is desired, in the prediction stage, it becomes necessary to define whether the individual 
unobserved heterogeneity represents need, non-need or a combination of both. As noted 
by Van Ourti (2004), the unobserved individual heterogeneity may reflect need factors 
(such as unobserved health) as well as non-need factors (such as health care preferences). 
The horizontal equity norm is that there is equal treatment for equal need. Therefore, the 
key condition that the predictions for need-based utilisation have to meet is that they vary 
only with need. Conversely, for the “conservative” HI index, it is required that predictions 
of non-need health care utilisation vary only with non-need factors. In the case of panel 
data models, these conditions may mean that different assumptions regarding the nature 
of the individual unobserved heterogeneity require different procedures to predict 
utilisation.  
Suppose, for example, that we had estimates for a latent class model with constant class 
membership probabilities (that is, πij in equation (6) are constant parameters, πj, j = 
1,…,C). With such an estimated model, the need-expected number of visits can then be 
predicted as [ ]∑= C
j
NN
t
N
ititjj
N
it xxyEy ,|ˆ π , where 
N
itx and 
NN
tx  are as defined above. In this 
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case, as long as two individuals ‘match’ in terms of the need characteristics, Nitx , their 
predicted utilisation is the same, even if they belong to different latent classes. Thus, the 
individual heterogeneity is treated as non-need. This treatment of the unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity resembles the treatment of the random effects in the panel data 
hurdle model used by Van Ourti (2004). Alternatively, if we assign each individual to the 
class of highest posterior probability, j* (using the posterior class membership 
probabilities given by equation (8)), we can obtain the predicted number of visits in year t 
as the expected value of yit, conditional on class j*, 
N
itx  and 
NN
tx : [ ]NNtNititjNit xxyEy ,|ˆ *= . In 
this case, given j*, the predictions vary only with need. Even amongst individuals that 
have the same values for the need variables, there is still variation in the predicted use to 
the extent that individuals are predicted to belong to different latent classes. Therefore, 
the individual heterogeneity (represented by membership to different latent classes) is 
treated as need. 
Consider now that the class membership probabilities are specified as functions of the 
covariates as in equation (7). Similarly to the x’s, the time-invariant determinants of class 
membership, z, can include both need and non-need factors. In this specification, individual 
unobserved heterogeneity is not restricted to be solely need or non-need as in the example 
above and can therefore be standardised for need and non-need. This feature makes the 
more flexible specification with variable πij(.) preferable for predicting (non-)need 
expected utilisation. Furthermore, the models estimated by Bago d’Uva and Jones (2006) 
do indeed show significant associations with both types of factors (especially with need) 
in almost all cases. The unobserved individual heterogeneity that we are able to partition 
into need and non-need, using this econometric specification, should not be confused 
with the variation that is unexplained by the regression, even if panel data are available. 
Inevitably, this variation cannot be partitioned and so has to be assumed to capture just 
non-need, as in the “conventional” approach, or just need, as in the “conservative” 
approach. Next, we explain how we predict need and non-need-expected utilisation from 
the latent class hurdle models. 
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Need-expected utilisation (for “conventional” HI) 
The need based predictions of health care use can be computed as: 
( ) [ ]∑= C
j
NN
t
N
ititj
NNN
iij
N
it xxyEzzy ,|,ˆˆ π ,                                         (9) 
where Nitx  and 
NN
tx  are as defined above, and NNz  are the sample averages of non-need 
variables characteristics that enter the class membership probabilities, πij(.), and Niz  are the 
actual values of the need variables in πij(.). Since the class membership probabilities are 
computed for fixed values of the non-need variables, we are assuming that, across 
individuals, only the variation in πij(.) that is related to need is legitimate. All the 
individuals with the same need are attributed the same class membership probabilities, 
regardless of the value of the non-need variables. Similarly, conditional on the latent class, 
the predictions vary only according to need. Therefore, the resulting predictions, 
unconditional on the latent class, Nityˆ , vary only with the observed need factors, in line 
with the horizontal equity norm.  
Non-need-expected utilisation (for “conservative” HI) 
The non-need based predictions of health care use can be computed as: 
( ) [ ]∑= C
j
NN
it
N
titj
NN
i
N
j
NN
it xxyEzzy ,|,ˆˆ π ,                                         (10) 
where Ntx and Nz are the sample averages of the need variables and NNitx and NNiz  are the 
actual values of the non-need variables. The class membership probabilities are computed 
for fixed values of the need variables and therefore, all the variation in πij(.) that is 
determined by non-need variables is considered illegitimate. Regardless of the need 
variables, all the individuals that are equal in terms of the non-need variables are predicted 
to have the same class membership probabilities and the same predicted use, conditional 
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on the latent class. Consequently, the resulting unconditional predictions, NNityˆ , vary only 
with observed non-need factors.  
 
3.  Data 
The data are taken from the European Community Household Panel User Database (ECHP-
UDB). The ECHP was designed and coordinated by Eurostat, and it was carried out 
annually between 1994 and 2001 (8 waves). This survey contains socioeconomic, 
demographic, health and health care utilisation variables, for a panel of individuals aged 
16 or older. The data result from a standardised questionnaire, which allows for cross-
country comparisons as well as longitudinal analysis. We use all the information that is 
available for 10 EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Austria joined the survey in 1995 (wave 2) and in 
Finland it started only in 1996 (wave 3). In the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and 
Germany, the ECHP was carried out from 1994 to 1997 (waves 1 to 3), after which it was 
replaced by national panel surveys. For this reason we drop these three countries. 
Additionally, we do not consider France because the French data do not contain detailed 
information on the number of specialist visits.  
We analyse health care utilisation over the previous year, represented by the number of 
visits to a GP and the number of visits to a specialist. These data are available from wave 
2 onwards (in wave 1, the information is not detailed by type of doctor). The ECHP 
income variable is total net household income. We use this variable in PPPs and deflated 
by national CPIs, in order to allow for comparability across countries and waves. The 
income variable was further divided by the OECD modified equivalence scale in order to 
account for household size and composition. The sample used is an unbalanced panel of 
individuals observed for up to 6 waves in the case of Finland and up to 7 waves for the 
remaining countries. The analysis of inequality and inequity presented here uses cross-
sectional individual weights. 
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Tables 1 to 3 contain the averages by country and wave of the three variables used in the 
measurement of socioeconomic inequality in health care: equivalised household income, 
specialist visits and GP visits. The countries with the lowest income levels are Portugal 
and Greece, followed by Spain and Italy. In general, there was an increase in the income 
levels throughout the panel, especially for Ireland (29%), Spain (22%) and Portugal (31%). 
There is substantial variation in the average number of reported GP visits  (see Table 2) 
across countries, with the lowest values for Finland and Greece, while Belgium has the 
highest values (as well as Italy, towards the end of the period, and Austria, especially in 
the beginning and the end of the period). Table 3 shows that the levels of utilisation of 
specialist care also vary considerably across Europe. Ireland is the country with the lowest 
average utilisation throughout the observed years, followed by Finland and Denmark 
which show a similar pattern. 
In the analysis of inequity in health care, we use an identical set of covariates across 
countries to represent need and non-need factors. As need indicators, we use 
demographics and one-year lagged health measures based on two questions: (a) responses 
to a question on self-assessed general health status as either very good, good, fair, bad or 
very bad5; and (b) responses to “Do you have any chronic physical or mental health 
problem, illness or disability? (yes/no)” and, if so, “Are you hampered in your daily 
activities by this physical or mental health problem, illness or disability? We use one 
dummy variable to indicate whether the individual has some limitation. Gender and age 
are represented by the variables: Age, Age2, a dummy variable for males (Male), 
Age×Male and Age2 ×Male.  
Apart from income, the following non-need variables are included: (i) the highest level of 
general or higher education completed, i.e. recognised third level education (ISCED 5-7), 
second stage of secondary level of education (ISCED 3) or less than second stage of 
secondary education (ISCED 0-2)); (ii) Marital status, distinguishing between married and 
                                                 
5 Across countries, the proportion of individuals that responds ‘very bad’ is very small, so we collapsed the 
categories ‘bad and very bad’. For Portugal, the category ‘very good’ also contains a small proportion of 
individuals, so we collapsed the categories  ‘good’ and ‘very good’ for this country.  
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unmarried (including cohabiting); (iii) Activity status includes employed, self-employed 
and not working. In additional, we include time dummies in the analysis to allow for time 
trends in mean utilization. 
 
4.  Results 
This section presents an analysis of income-related inequality and horizontal inequity in 
the utilisation of primary (GP) and secondary (specialist) care for 10 EU member states. 
Latent class (panel data) hurdle models were estimated separately for each country and for 
GP and specialist visits in Bago d’Uva and Jones (2006). This econometric specification 
outperformed alternative specifications considered in that paper. In particular, it was 
shown to fit the data substantially better than the standard hurdle model, which does not 
account for the panel feature of the data, for all countries analysed here and for both GP 
and specialist visits. The results are used in this paper to obtain need-expected and non-
need-expected health care use. In the estimation of LC models, the class membership 
probabilities πij were allowed to depend on covariates, and found to be associated 
especially with need but also with non-need factors, in almost all cases. We are able to 
account for this partition between need and non-need in the prediction of (non-)need-
expected health care utilisation, as explained in Section 2.3. We then follow what was 
described in Section 2.2 to compute short-run indices (by wave), and their weighted 
average, and long-run HI indices, for each country, according to the “conventional” and 
the “conservative” versions of HI.6 We mainly focus on the horizontal inequity indices 
based on all waves available (i.e., long-run and weighted averages of short-run indices), for 
each country, because these provide a more robust and reliable picture of inequity in 
                                                 
6 We provide only point estimates of the inequality and horizontal inequity measures because the 
computation time involved in computing bootstrap confidence intervals is prohibitive in our case. This is 
due to the cost of obtaining maximum likelihood estimates of the panel data finite mixture hurdle model we 
use here to predict health care utilisation, which requires repeated estimations with a number of different 
sets of starting values, often facing convergence difficulties. These obstacles would then have to be 
overcome for each of the bootstrap replications. 
 16
health care utilisation across the entire period. For illustrative purposes, we only report 
year-specific results for the “conservative” approach.  
GP visits 
Table 4 presents results of long-run and short-run inequality and inequity in the number 
of GP visits for the 10 countries considered in the analysis, ranked by the values of the 
LR “conservative” HI index. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 show pro-poor inequality in GP 
visits for all countries. It is clear that pro-poor long-run income-related inequality in GP 
visits is larger for Ireland (-0.167), Greece (-0.158) and Belgium (-.161) than for the 
remaining countries. Finland is the country with the lowest long-run pro-poor inequality 
of GP visits (-.028). The rankings of countries by LR and average SR inequality coincide, 
except for the relative positions between Spain and Denmark that have almost equal 
indices. LR pro-poor inequality is underestimated by the average of the SR indices for all 
but one country (The Netherlands). This means that income ranking is not constant 
across time and that changes in income ranking are associated with systematic differences 
in health care utilisation. In particular, the results suggest that individuals that move 
downwards in the income ranking tend to have more GP visits than the ones that move 
upwards. This may be partly explained by the tendency for the downwardly income 
mobile to have relatively lower levels of health, as shown by Hernández et al (2006) for 
two health indicators in the ECHP. 
Table 4 
After controlling for unequal need distributions, and following the “conventional” HI 
approach (columns 4 and 5, Table 4), we can distinguish two groups of countries: for 
Finland, Portugal and Austria, the indices are positive (except for a slightly negative LR 
index for Austria); for the remaining countries, there is pro-poor inequity in the use of 
GPs. For Finland, all the short-run indices (on average, 0.028) as well as the long-run 
index (0.028) are larger than for the remaining countries, showing the largest pro-rich 
inequity. Averaged across waves, short-run pro-poor inequity is larger for Belgium (-
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0.053), followed by Ireland (-0.045) and Spain (-0.039). In the long-run, pro-poor inequity 
is larger for Ireland and Belgium (-0.055, -0.054) and Spain (-0.038). Across countries, 
there are discrepancies between the short-run and the long-run measures of inequity. 
These long-run indices are larger than the weighted average of the short-run ones for 5 of 
the 10 countries but the differences are generally small. 
Across countries, the results obtained here for 1996 wave of the ECHP (not shown) are 
of the same sign as the ones obtained in DKJ (2004) for the same wave. For 6 of the 9 
countries in common in both studies, the 1996 inequity indices obtained here are larger 
(more pro-rich or less pro-poor) than the ones in the previous paper.  
Let us now turn to the analysis of HI according to the new “conservative” approach. 
Table 4 and Figure 1 show results wave by wave, and their weighted average, as well as LR 
HI indices. Finland has the highest levels of pro-rich inequity in GP visits (average short-
run, 0.033; long-run, 0.035), followed by Portugal and Austria. The remaining countries 
exhibit pro-poor inequity, and this is greater for Spain, Ireland, Belgium and Italy and less 
pronounced for Greece, Denmark and The Netherlands. Except for Greece and Italy, 
measured inequity increases when the long-run perspective is adopted, but the 
discrepancies are very small.   
Figure 1 
The “conservative” and “conventional” HI indices have the same index signs and 
therefore provide the same answers to the question of whether there is pro-rich or pro-
poor inequity in GPs visits in the countries studied here. Similarly, the ranking of 
countries according to HI is generally robust to the approach chosen. An exception is 
Italy that belongs to the group of countries with smaller pro-poor “conventional” 
inequity, while it is among the ones with largest pro-poor “conservative” inequity. 
However, the “conservative” approach generally results in larger HI indices than the 
“conventional” approach. For Greece, this is only true for the LR indices; for Spain, the 
LR and average SR HI indices are equal, regardless of the approach; and for Italy the 
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“conventional” approach gives higher SR and LR indices. This suggests that the 
differences between the “conventional” HI indices, that assume that the variation 
unexplained by the regression models used for the predictions of GP visits is all non-
need, and the “conservative” HI indices, that only consider as non-need the variation that 
is demonstrably associated with non-need factors, are mostly due to pro-poor 
contributions. Our results show that the assumptions regarding the need/non-need nature 
of the residuals may influence the estimated level of horizontal inequity. In particular, if 
the residuals were pro-poor and due to need rather than non-need factors, horizontal 
inequity in GP visits would be underestimated by the “conventional” HI method for most 
of the countries studied in this paper. 
Specialist visits  
Income-related inequality in the number of specialist visits is summarised in the 
concentration indices in Table 5 (where the countries are ranked by long-run 
“conservative” inequity indices,). Portugal has the highest level of pro-rich inequality (LR 
and average SR indices equal 0.102 and 0.112), followed closely by Finland (HIT = 0.085, 
average HIt = 0.080). Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands have pro-poor inequality. 
Greece is the country that presents the largest pro-poor inequality (HIT = -.068, average 
HIt = -0.051). The rankings of countries according to LR and average SR indices are the 
same, except that LR pro-poor inequality is larger in Belgium than in The Netherlands, 
while the SR measure indicates the opposite. The LR measures are larger than the average 
of the SR indices for half of the countries studied. The Netherlands and Denmark are the 
countries for which the SR measure understates the LR measure most, indicating more 
clearly in these two countries that upwardly mobile individuals tend to use relatively more 
specialist care, even if there is pro-poor inequality (in the SR for both countries and only 
in The Netherlands, in the LR). 
Table 5 
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Table 5 also shows estimates of horizontal inequity indices for specialist visits according 
to the “conventional” and “conventional” methods. We first analyse the results given by 
the “conventional” approach and compare them with the ones obtained by DKJ (2004). 
The LR and average SR HI indices are positive, indicating pro-rich inequity in specialist 
visits, for all countries. The largest levels of pro-rich inequity are observed for Portugal 
(long-run, 0.204; short-run, on average, 0.199) and Finland (long-run, 0.134; short-run, on 
average, 0.143). Pro-rich inequity is smaller in Belgium (long-run, 0.034; average short-
run, 0.040) and the Netherlands (long-run, 0.026; average short-run, 0.050). Comparing 
the long-run and the weighted average of short-run indices in Table 5, we can see that, for 
7 of the 10 countries considered, long-run pro-rich inequity is understated by the average 
of the short-run measures. For the exceptions ― Austria, Greece and Italy ― the long-run 
pro-rich inequity is slightly smaller than the short-run pro-rich inequity.  
Like DKJ (2004), we find pro-rich inequity for all countries. Also, apart from Finland, not 
included in the previous study, and Luxembourg, not included here, the countries with the 
highest pro-rich inequity in both studies are Portugal and Ireland, while that inequity is 
lowest for Belgium and the Netherlands. However, for 7 of the 9 overlapping countries, 
the results obtained here for 1996 using the “conventional” method (not shown) are 
larger than the ones obtained in the previous paper. This suggests that the panel data 
model used in this paper to predict need-expected use may be more capable to account 
for need (observed and unobserved) than cross-section models. Except for Ireland, the 
long-run “conventional” HI indices presented here are also larger than the ones obtained 
for 1996 in DKJ (2004). On the whole, the longer-run picture provided in this paper 
indicates greater levels of horizontal inequity than the existing evidence.   
We now turn to the results using the new “conservative” HI index, presented in Table 5 
and Figure 2. Across waves and in the long-run, there is pro-rich inequity in specialist 
visits. Throughout the observed period, the largest inequity indices are obtained for 
Portugal (average short-run, 0.180; long-run, 0.195), followed by Ireland (average short-
run, 0.142; long-run, 0.157) and Finland (average short-run, 0.142; long-run, 0.152). The 
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lowest short-run indices are registered for The Netherlands (on average, 0.037), Belgium 
(on average, 0.052) and Denmark (on average, 0.057). These three countries are also the 
ones with the lowest levels of long-run HI (indices equal to 0.046, 0.066 and 0.078, 
respectively). For all countries, the long-run measure of inequity is larger than the 
weighted average of short-run indices. This suggests that, not only richer individuals tend 
to use more specialist care in the short-run (controlling for need) but, also, individuals 
that move up in the income distribution over time tend to have more specialist visits than 
the ones that move in the opposite direction. This feature of inequity in the use of 
specialists cannot be identified when inequity is measured in cross-sections, or when the 
panel feature of the data is not accounted for. The short-run perspective results in 
underestimations of long-run inequity ranging from 6% (Finland and Greece) to 27% 
(Denmark). 
Figure 2 
Both the “conventional” and the “conservative” approaches tell us that there is pro-rich 
inequity in all the countries under analysis. However, the more “conservative” method 
does not deliver lower but larger LR HI indices for 6 of the 10 countries and larger 
averaged SR indices, in all but two cases. The two methods result in rather similar 
rankings of countries according to LR horizontal inequity. Exceptions are Belgium, 
Ireland and Greece that move up the ranking the most, when going from the LR 
“conventional” HI to the LR “conservative” HI method, as a result of being the countries 
that show the largest discrepancies between the two methods. Recall that the two 
methods differ in their treatment of the variation unexplained by the need and non-need 
factors included in the regressions of the number of specialist visits. In the 
“conventional” method, this variation is considered to be non-need, while in the new 
“conservative” method, it is assumed to reflect need. The fact that the “conservative” HI 
indices are, on the whole, larger than the “conventional” ones indicates that the 
differences between the two represent pro-poor contributions to inequity. If it is the case 
that the residuals are pro-poor and that they capture mainly justifiable variation in the use 
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of specialists, then the “conventional” approach underestimates inequity in specialist use 
in most countries, as that fraction of health care use that is attributed to non-need makes 
a pro-poor contribution to horizontal inequity.7 
 
5. Conclusion 
Achieving equitable access to health care for all citizens, irrespective of their incomes, 
remains an important public health policy goal in Europe’s largely publicly funded health 
care systems. Key to the monitoring of the extent to which various systems are successful 
in attaining this goal is the appropriate and reliable measurement of the degree of income-
related inequity. Over the last two decades, Europe has invested heavily in the collection 
of comparable data to enable proper analysis and comparison of EU member countries’ 
relative performance. The completion of the European Community Household Panel surveys 
for the first time provides an opportunity to adopt a longitudinal perspective in this 
comparison.  
This paper has exploited the full length of the European panel in an attempt to obtain 
more reliable estimates of inequity than what a single cross-section of data can provide. In 
doing so, we believe it makes three contributions. First, it exploits an important advantage 
of panel data in this context, which is the possibility to account for time-invariant 
individual unobserved heterogeneity in estimating models used for the prediction of 
health care use. Using latent class models, the required partitioning of the explained 
variation in use of care into need and not need related can be expanded to the time-
invariant individual heterogeneity captured by the class membership probabilities. As a 
result, a greater share of variation can be explained and therefore used for the 
measurement of income-related inequity in health care use. We find that in almost all 
                                                 
7 The results of decomposition analysis in DKJ (2004) provide some support to the argument that a pro-
poor residual contribution may be mainly due to unobserved need. In that paper, the observed need 
variables make always a pro-poor contribution to inequity in specialist visits, while the contribution of 
income and other non-need variables is mostly pro-rich. 
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cases, this extension leads to higher (i.e. less pro-poor or more pro-rich) index values. 
This suggests that much of the variation associated with income that remains unexplained 
in cross-sectional models not accounting for heterogeneity derives from unobserved need 
heterogeneity.  
Secondly, we document the differences between short (one year) and long (multi-year) run 
measures of horizontal inequity using indices which account for income mobility of users 
over time. We find that, for almost all countries, the long-run indices are higher than the 
average short-run indices, especially in the case of specialist visits.  This suggests that 
upward income mobility contributes to more pro-rich (or less pro-poor) inequity while 
downward mobility does the opposite. In other words, given the same needs, doctors are 
not only consulted more often by those with higher incomes, but also by those with faster 
growing incomes. This is of interest, as it suggests a hitherto unappreciated role of income 
mobility in the generation of patterns of income-related inequity in use.  
Thirdly, we have proposed a new, more “conservative” approach to the measurement of 
inequity that is not inherently related to the availability of panel data. It differs from the 
“conventional” method in the way that the unexplained variation in health care use is 
treated. In the new approach, only the income-related variation in health care use that is 
demonstrably related to non-need factors is considered as inequitable. While we have 
labeled this a more conservative approach than the conventional one, which defines all 
income-related variation that is not demonstrably need-related as inequitable, it 
nonetheless tends to give higher index estimates. This is a consequence of the fact that 
the difference between the two approaches can be either pro-poor or pro-rich distributed, 
and we find it generally to be more pro-poor.    
Finally, we have investigated the effect of each of these methodological extensions using 
panel data from 10 EU countries. Like DKJ (2004), we confirm the finding of pro-poor 
inequality in GP visits in most countries and pro-rich inequality in specialist visits in all 
countries, across waves. The analysis of long-run inequity confirms some of the results on 
short-run inequity presented in DKJ (2004). For example, Portugal shows the highest 
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long-run pro-rich inequity in specialist visits. Finland (not included in DKJ) presents the 
second (third) highest level of pro-rich long-run inequity in specialist visits according to 
the “conventional” (“conservative”) approach. The rankings of countries by level of long-
run inequity in the use of primary and specialised care are generally in accordance with 
those obtained for 1996 in DKJ (2004). The general result of pro-poor inequity in GP 
visits in most (7 out of 10) EU countries and pro-rich inequity in specialists in all 
countries studied does not change with the longitudinal perspective employed here or 
with the new “conservative” measurement of horizontal inequity. Similarly, the rankings 
of countries are fairly robust to variations in the approach. 
All in all, our re-assessment based on panel data largely corroborates and strengthens the 
earlier cross-sectional findings. It appears then, that the earlier conclusion of people in 
equal need not all being treated equally also holds after analyzing the full panel data set of 
the ECHP. Our results however suggest that better control for need, adoption of a 
longer-run perspective and even using an arguably more conservative index all lead to 
more pro-rich estimates for specialist care and less pro-poor inequity in GP care.  
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Table 1: Average equivalised annual household income (real terms, common currency)  
  95 96 97 98 99 00 01 
Austria  13872 13348 13359 13861 13975 13671 
Belgium 14683 14560 14526 14769 15649 15744 16012 
Denmark 13655 11290 13712 14099 14243 14270 14454 
Finland   11790 12024 12319 12384 12715 
Greece 7028 7039 7252 7582 7651 7914 7987 
Ireland 11259 11421 11967 12627 13337 13510 14526 
Italy 9949 9941 9836 10291 10559 10667 10829 
Netherlands 12736 12826 12968 13098 13393 13211 13388 
Portugal 6345 6666 6934 7307 7670 7888 8342 
Spain 8367 8551 8660 8953 9567 9909 10189 
 
Table 2: Average number of GP visits in previous year 
  95 96 97 98 99 00 01 
Austria  5.17 4.55 4.76 4.58 4.76 4.83 
Belgium 4.95 4.95 4.80 5.04 4.99 4.95 4.85 
Denmark 2.83 2.89 2.86 3.10 2.77 2.71 2.99 
Finland   2.12 2.08 2.11 2.12 2.05 
Greece 2.22 2.25 2.35 2.11 2.02 2.18 1.94 
Ireland 3.53 3.44 3.58 3.69 3.65 3.54 3.58 
Italy 3.93 4.29 4.63 4.49 4.67 4.65 4.68 
Netherlands 2.86 2.75 2.77 2.91 2.86 2.85 2.83 
Portugal 3.09 3.21 3.15 3.23 3.18 3.11 2.99 
Spain 3.94 3.63 4.45 3.89 3.73 3.60 4.13 
 
Table 3: Average number of specialist visits in previous year 
 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 
Austria  2.60 2.09 2.07 2.09 2.15 2.11 
Belgium 1.90 1.92 1.93 2.07 1.99 2.02 2.05 
Denmark 0.86 0.98 0.98 1.06 1.03 1.02 1.07 
Finland   1.02 1.03 1.04 1.08 1.05 
Greece 1.66 1.66 1.91 1.66 1.73 1.80 1.75 
Ireland 0.67 0.62 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.68 
Italy 1.09 1.21 1.41 1.29 1.31 1.29 1.33 
Netherlands 1.76 1.66 1.51 1.67 1.62 1.69 1.66 
Portugal 1.03 1.21 1.22 1.26 1.29 1.34 1.26 
Spain 1.70 1.50 1.69 1.62 1.57 1.60 1.70 
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Table 4: Short-run (SR) and long-run (LR) inequality and inequity for number of GP visits  
 Inequality (CI)  “Conventional” HI “Conservative” HI 
 avg SR LR  avg SR LR 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 avg SR LR 
Spain -0.099 -0.102  -0.039 -0.038 -0.038 -0.037 -0.038 -0.037 -0.039 -0.042 -0.043 -0.039 -0.038 
Ireland -0.150 -0.167  -0.045 -0.054 -0.038 -0.036 -0.035 -0.036 -0.036 -0.034 -0.034 -0.036 -0.035 
Belgium -0.146 -0.161  -0.053 -0.055 -0.028 -0.031 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.033 
Italy -0.069 -0.071  -0.027 -0.024 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.037 -0.037 -0.039 -0.039 -0.035 -0.033 
Greece -0.134 -0.158  -0.016 -0.025 -0.020 -0.017 -0.020 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.021 
Denmark -0.098 -0.104  -0.020 -0.016 -0.016 -0.013 -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.020 -0.016 -0.014 
Netherlands -0.078 -0.072  -0.028 -0.022 -0.020 -0.020 -0.017 -0.012 -0.014 -0.011 -0.012 -0.015 -0.013 
Austria -0.080 -0.092  0.009 -0.001  0.009 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.011 
Portugal -0.081 -0.096  0.018 0.019 0.032 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.022 0.024 
Finland -0.024 -0.028  0.028 0.028   0.030 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.035 
 
Table 5: Short-run (SR) and long-run (LR) inequality and inequity for number of specialist visits 
 Inequality (CI)  “Conventional” HI “Conservative” HI 
 avg SR LR  avg SR LR 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 avg SR LR 
Netherlands -0.045 -0.021  0.026 0.050 0.036 0.040 0.041 0.045 0.043 0.035 0.020 0.037 0.047 
Belgium -0.036 -0.038  0.034 0.040 0.054 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.053 0.049 0.040 0.052 0.066 
Denmark -0.023 0.000  0.052 0.088 0.059 0.059 0.068 0.064 0.064 0.048 0.040 0.057 0.078 
Austria 0.029 0.026  0.090 0.089  0.072 0.091 0.089 0.088 0.078 0.073 0.082 0.088 
Spain 0.017 0.018  0.083 0.089 0.097 0.103 0.103 0.100 0.093 0.078 0.074 0.092 0.105 
Greece -0.051 -0.068  0.073 0.070 0.112 0.104 0.103 0.102 0.101 0.095 0.084 0.100 0.106 
Italy 0.046 0.042  0.096 0.094 0.107 0.111 0.105 0.106 0.105 0.100 0.088 0.103 0.114 
Finland 0.080 0.085  0.134 0.143   0.128 0.151 0.151 0.149 0.133 0.142 0.152 
Ireland 0.015 0.015  0.123 0.128 0.145 0.142 0.150 0.147 0.142 0.138 0.129 0.142 0.157 
Portugal 0.112 0.103  0.199 0.204 0.199 0.180 0.179 0.192 0.176 0.171 0.167 0.180 0.195 
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 Figure 1: Short-run (SR) and long-run (LR) “conservative” inequity for number of GP visits, by country 
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 Figure 2: Short-run (SR) and long-run (LR) “conservative” inequity for number of specialist visits, by 
country 
